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RATLIFF V. ASTRUE: THE COLLISION OF THE EQUAL 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT AND THE DEBT COLLECTION 
IMPROVEMENT ACT 
Joseph A. Fischetti ∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, Congress passed the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 
a partial waiver of sovereign immunity permitting “prevailing parties” 
in cases against the federal government to recover attorney’s fees and 
costs.
1
  The original EAJA contained a sunset provision and expired 
in 1984 but was promptly reenacted and has since remained in place.
2
  
Historically, attorney’s fee payments under the EAJA were directed to 
the attorney of the prevailing party or to the attorney and her client 
jointly.
3
  This system allowed for the attorney to collect her fees 
promptly without going through her client as an intermediary. 
In a series of recent cases, most frequently involving successful 
appeals of administrative denials of Social Security disability benefits, 
the government has argued that the literal language of the EAJA does 
not allow for direct payment to attorneys but instead directs fees ex-
clusively to the clients themselves.
4
  At first glance, this distinction 
might appear minor and technical as well as perhaps inefficient or 
inconvenient, but not devastating in its repercussions.  This new sys-
tem, however, poses two significant problems that effectively under-
mine the fee-shifting goals of the EAJA.  First, it forces the client to 
serve as an extra channel through whom the funds must travel before 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005, The 
George Washington University.  Sincere thanks to Professor Thomas Healy for his 
supervision and advice, and to Brian De Vito, Keerthi Mundrati, and Steven Zaorski 
for their comments and assistance. 
 1 Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 204(a), 94 Stat. 2321, 2327–29. 
 2 Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2006). 
 3 See Stephens v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2009); Respondent’s Brief in 
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Astrue v. Ratliff, No. 08-1322 (U.S. 
June 25, 2009). 
 4 See, e.g., Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48 
(2009); Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 
(2008). 
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reaching their ultimate destination.  Given that fees permissible un-
der the EAJA are quite meager
5
 and that clients who avail themselves 
of the fees often face financial hardship, the possibility of nonpay-
ment or partial payment is substantial.  Second, and more important-
ly, direct payment to the client qualifies the payments for automatic 
offset pursuant to the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996.
6
  
Therefore, a client can win his suit and receive an award of attorney’s 
fees but lack the opportunity to furnish those fees to his attorney be-
cause of the automatic offset of the fees against the client’s other out-
standing debts to the government.
7
  These offsets have spawned re-
cent litigation to determine the proper payable party because fee 
payments are not subject to offsets when they are in the name of the 
attorney rather than the debtor-client.  If continued, the offsets could 
have the long-term effect of creating a disincentive for attorneys to 
enter practice areas that are reliant on government-paid attorney’s 
fees, especially for clients with other outstanding debts.
8
  As a result, 
direct payment of attorney’s fees to indebted clients essentially de-
feats the purpose of the EAJA by removing the attorney’s assurance 
that she will receive those fees if she prevails in her case. 
Circuits are split on whether fees should be paid to the client or 
his counsel.  Most courts side with the government’s interpretation of 
the statute and order payment of the funds to the “prevailing party” 
rather than counsel.
9
  But a sizable minority of courts have instead 
sided with the claimants
10
 and ordered payment of the fees directly to 
their attorneys.
11
  When courts pay EAJA fees directly to the attorneys, 
 
 5 The statutory cap on EAJA fee payments is $125 per hour, with adjustments for 
cost of living expenses.  § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
 6 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (2006); see infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text. 
 7 To be offset under the Debt Collection Improvement Act, the debt must be to 
a government agency.  § 3716(a).  The offsets are not available to assist in recovery 
for private creditors.   
 8 See Stephens v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 139 n.4 (4th Cir. 2009) (“At oral argu-
ment, counsel for Stephens, who represented all thirty-four of the claimants in this 
case, stated that he already had declined representation for several Social Security 
claimants who would have been subject to an administrative offset.”). 
 9 See, e.g., Bryant v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 578 F.3d 443, 449 (6th Cir. 2009); Ste-
phens, 565 F.3d at 140; Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 2008); Manning 
v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008).  
 10 For reasons discussed infra note 63, litigation on this matter most frequently 
features the client seeking direct payment to his attorney while the government seeks 
to pay directly to the client.  The client’s best interests are typically served by keeping 
the fees in his attorney’s name so as to avoid potential government offsets. 
 11 See, e.g., Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. 
Ct. 48 (2009); see also King v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 230 F. App’x 476, 481 (6th Cir. 
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they generally do so for policy reasons and for the sake of consisten-
cy, as most courts, until recently, always paid attorneys directly.
12
 
If the disputes on this question were confined to Social Security 
disability appeals, where most of the litigation in this area has so far 
taken place, the impact of these decisions would be limited to that ra-
ther narrow and esoteric field.  But the EAJA can be implicated in 
nearly all civil suits against the federal government.
13
  The broader ef-
fect of interpreting the EAJA to direct funds to the client may be to 
dissuade attorneys from entering any practice area with a substantial 
number of cases in which a federal government agency, department, 
or official will be a party.  Beyond the EAJA, applying a literal reading 
of the “prevailing party” language presents a broader problem.  This 
language, awarding the fees to “prevailing parties,” is not isolated to 
the EAJA; rather, it is boilerplate fee-shifting language for federal sta-
tutes that permit recovery of attorney’s fees in countless areas, includ-
ing civil rights statutes, environmental laws, and consumer protection 
actions.
14
  If courts in EAJA cases continue to direct payments to 
clients rather than counsel, a genuine and substantial risk exists that 
the resulting precedent could apply to civil-rights statutes and any 
other statute containing the same “prevailing party” fee-shifting lan-
guage.  Under current Supreme Court precedent, the term “prevail-
ing party” applies identically across federal statutes.15  Therefore, a 
holding with regard to the proper payable party in a case involving 
the EAJA will be applicable to all other similar fee-shifting statutes 
employing that language.  In that event, the effect of permitting off-
sets from attorney’s fee statutes would be to dissuade attorneys from 
entering numerous practice areas that are reliant on such statutes. 
Part II of this Comment will discuss the legislative history of the 
EAJA and compare Supreme Court rulings on the “prevailing party” 
language.  Part III of this Comment will summarize the competing 
views of the circuit courts that have disagreed on the question of who 
 
2007) (unpublished decision), overruled by Bryant v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 578 F.3d 
443, 446–47 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 12 See, e.g., Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 802; King, 230 F. App’x at 481. 
 13 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2006) (“[A] court may award reasonable fees and ex-
penses of attorneys . . . to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against 
the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official 
capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action.”) (emphasis added). 
 14 See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 15 E.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983); 
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 n.4 (1980). 
FISCHETTI (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2010  4:59 PM 
726 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:723 
 
is the proper recipient of attorney’s fees awarded pursuant to the 
EAJA.  Part IV of this Comment explains why the client is currently 
the proper payable party in the absence of an assignment of fees to 
his attorney, discusses the potential impact that these EAJA-related 
rulings could have on civil-rights statutes, and evaluates potential 
judicial and legislative options for improvement of the law in this 
area.  Ultimately, this Comment will argue that the EAJA directs pay-
ments to the client, not his attorney, but that this process can be cir-
cumvented through the use of assignments.  Nevertheless, to fix this 
problem fully, Congress will need to initiate legislative reforms. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND “PREVAILING PARTY” INTERPRETATION 
Congress enacted the original EAJA in 1980 as a component of a 
bill providing assistance for small business.
16
  The originally enacted 
legislation contained a sunset provision that caused the law to expire 
in 1984.
17
  The EAJA was renewed on a permanent basis in 1985, and 
the new version contained a retroactivity provision to fill the gap 
from the time of the original EAJA’s expiration.18  The new version 
contained some minor technical amendments, but the core of the law 
remained intact.
19
  Congress included additional amendments as part 
of a 1996 reform package;
20
 it proposed more amendments recently, 
but none has passed or even gained traction.
21
 
A. Legislative History 
Most of the EAJA’s official legislative history comes from the 
House Judiciary Committee Report that accompanied passage of the 
 
 16 Act of Oct. 21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2321. 
 17 Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of At-
torney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 222 
(1994). 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 For information about the 1996 amendments, which are mostly outside the 
scope of this Comment, see Judith E. Kramer, Equal Access to Justice Act Amendments of 
1996: A New Avenue for Recovering Fees from the Government, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 
(1999).  The changes allow parties to recover fees in situations where the govern-
ment prevails but its original demand is “substantially in excess of the final award” 
and also increase the inflation-adjusted hourly rate cap from $75 to $125.  Id. at 376–
77. 
 21 H.R. 1735, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 5833, 110th Cong. (2008); Albert B. 
Crenshaw, GAO Finds Little Help to Understand Rules; Agencies Flout the Law, Report Says, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2002, at E8. 
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1980 legislation.
22
  The report reveals that the legislation was de-
signed to benefit “certain individuals, partnerships, corporations and 
labor and other organizations” by ensuring that they are not “de-
terred from seeking review of, or defending against unreasonable go-
vernmental action because of the expense involved in securing the 
vindication of their rights.”23  Through a requirement that funds be 
paid directly from agency coffers, the EAJA’s design serves a two-fold 
purpose: to make it easier for individuals and small businesses to seek 
remedies against the federal government and to deter government 
agencies from abusing their power.
24
 
The legislation accomplished its goal through a limited statutory 
exception to the “American Rule” on attorney’s fee payments and 
through a waiver of sovereign immunity.  The longstanding practice 
in American jurisprudence is for each party to a civil lawsuit to bear 
the burden of its own costs.
25
  Under the English Rule, by contrast, 
the losing party is responsible for paying the fees of the winning par-
ty.
26
  The policy incentives behind either rule will inevitably clash 
when adversaries have disproportionate wealth and resources.  For 
example, under the American Rule, a poor client will be left respon-
sible for his own fees despite prevailing against a major corporation, 
whereas under the English Rule, a prevailing corporation can impose 
 
 22 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984.  Al-
though the EAJA was originally proposed in the Senate, the Senate Small Business 
Committee’s Report simply adopted the House Report and did not issue any inde-
pendent findings of significance.  S. REP. NO. 96-974 passim (1980), as reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4953.  Similarly, the Conference Report on the EAJA essentially 
summarizes the statutory text, providing little in the way of interpretation or explana-
tion.  H.R. REP. NO. 96-1434, at 20–28 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5010–17. 
 23 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 5, as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4984. 
 24 See id. at 9–10; see also Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 890 (1989) (interpret-
ing the EAJA “in light of its purpose to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking re-
view of, or defending against, government action”) (internal citations omitted). 
 25 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247–54, 269 
(1975) (explaining the history of and reaffirming the American Rule by precluding 
fee-shifting without an existing authorization under statute or common law); Arcam-
bel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) (overturning the inclusion of attor-
ney’s fees, recognizing the prevailing practice among the states, and establishing the 
American Rule). 
 26 John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s 
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1601–13 (1993) (discussing the current Unit-
ed Kingdom law as part of a broader comparative discussion of fee-shifting rules in 
different jurisdictions). 
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its substantial fee costs upon a near-insolvent losing plaintiff.
27
  In this 
sense, the advantages and disadvantages of each rule can vary based 
on the outcome of the case.  In different circumstances, each rule 
can appear just or unjust based on whether the wealthier party pre-
vails.
28
  The American Rule is not ironclad, and it has some excep-
tions in both common law and statutory law, but it is the general rule 
for lawsuits in the United States.
29
 
In its entirety, the EAJA contains three separate fee-shifting pro-
visions.
30
  The first provision is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity 
that opens the federal government to the same common-law excep-
tions to the American Rule as a private party would face.
31
  The 
second provision extends the waiver to instances where the court 
finds the government’s position to be unreasonable.32  The third pro-
vision creates a process for recovering costs when a party prevails in 
an administrative adjudication.
33
 
The legislation operates in a straightforward and direct manner 
but contains a significant amount of language that has been disputed 
and can be subject to multiple interpretations.  The statute awards 
both “a judgment for costs” and “reasonable fees and expenses of at-
torneys . . . to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or 
against the United States or any agency or any official of the United 
States acting in his or her official capacity.”34  Within thirty days of a 
final judgment, the party seeking an award of fees must submit an 
application to the court, including “an itemized statement from any 
attorney or expert witness representing or appearing on behalf of the 
party.”35  If the court then determines that the party prevailed in the 
suit, the party will be entitled to compensation for costs, including at-
 
 27 For real-life examples of such dilemmas, see Tim Cornwell, “Double or Quits:” 
Quayle Likes the “English Rule” but Brits Have Their Doubts, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 10, 1992, 
at 1, available at 1992 WLNR 5213065.  Insurance will often cover the costs of the los-
ing party in English Rule jurisdictions.  Dan Slater, The Debate over Who Pays Fees When 
Litigants Mount Attacks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2008, at A8. 
 28 Note that the EAJA works only to the advantage of the individual or small 
business: the government may be forced to pay the plaintiff’s costs, but the plaintiff is 
never under any obligation to pay the costs of the government. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) 
(2006). 
 29 See Vargo, supra note 26, at 1578–90. 
 30 See Sisk, supra note 17, at 223–25.  
 31 Id. at 223. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 224. 
 34 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1), (b) (2006). 
 35 § 2412(d)(1)(B). 
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torney’s fees.36  There are, however, three significant limitations on 
the right of a prevailing party to receive fees.  First, awarded fees can-
not exceed $125 per hour, subject to cost of living adjustments.
37
  
Second, when a client is an individual with a net worth over $2 mil-
lion or a business or business owner with a net worth over $7 million, 
the client is not eligible for fee payments.
38
  Third, if “the court finds 
that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that 
special circumstances make an award unjust,” then the court will not 
grant an award.
39
 
The statute directs the fees and costs to the “prevailing party,” a 
term mirrored in many other federal statutes.
40
  When Congress 
enacted the EAJA, it was cognizant of the existence of statutes using 
identical language in other contexts, including civil-rights and envi-
ronmental statutes.
41
  Despite the seemingly clear meaning of this 
language, the term “prevailing party” has been the subject of signifi-
cant litigation.
42
  Congress did not use the EAJA committee report as 
a venue to provide additional guidance on interpreting the term, but 
instead stated only that “[i]t is the committee’s intention that the in-
terpretation of the term [‘prevailing party’] be consistent with the 
law that has developed under existing statutes.”43 
B. Judicial Interpretation of “Prevailing Party” Language 
Congress made clear its intention that existing precedent on the 
term “prevailing party” should control interpretation of the EAJA.44  
When Congress passed the EAJA, the direct recipient of the funds was 
 
 36 § 2412(d)(1)(A). 
 37 § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
 38 § 2412(d)(2)(B). 
 39 § 2412(d)(1)(A). 
 40 § 2412(b), (d)(1)(A). 
 41 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 8 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 
4987.  Specifically, the committee report pointed to Titles II and VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Title III of the Orga-
nized Crime Control Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Voting Rights Act of 
1975, the Consumer Product Safety Act, and the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Award 
Act of 1976.  Id.  But the list from the committee report is not exhaustive.  Other ex-
amples of the same “prevailing party” language can be found in statutes such as the 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2006), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) 
(2006), and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B), (3)(B), (4) (2006). 
 42 See infra Part II.B. 
 43 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 11, as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at  4990. 
 44 Id. 
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an uncontroversial matter.
45
  The drafters probably never contem-
plated the possibility of such a dispute.  The legislative history con-
tains an in-depth discussion of what precisely, under existing 
precedent, makes a party qualify as “prevailing” in light of the possi-
bilities of reversed appellate victories, partial victories, and partial re-
versals.
46
  By the time Congress drafted the EAJA, significant litigation 
had already taken place over the term’s definition, but none of it fo-
cused on the determination of the payable party.
47
  Since the passage 
of the EAJA, a great deal of litigation has ensued over the “prevailing 
party” language and the interplay between an attorney and her client 
on the issue of fee payments.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has 
yet to directly address the question of who is the proper payee,
48
 but it 
has provided some guidance for how to interpret the phrase.
49
  Most 
importantly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that all statutes 
that include the phrase “prevailing party” with regard to attorney’s 
fees should receive identical interpretive treatment.
50
 
When the Court has discussed issues of fees for prevailing par-
ties, it has frequently referred to the fees as belonging not just to the 
“prevailing party” but also to the “claimant” and “plaintiff.”51  Al-
though these dicta are not dispositive, they demonstrate that the 
Court, like Congress, views the payable party as the client, claimant, 
or plaintiff, and not the attorney representing him.  In other in-
 
 45 Contemporaneous cases interpreting language of the EAJA and other “prevail-
ing party” fee-shifting statutes do not directly discuss the dilemma of determining a 
proper recipient, and dicta in those cases suggest that courts were not even contem-
plating the question.  See infra notes 51–65 and accompanying text.  
 46 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 11–12, as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4990–91. 
 47 Sisk, supra note 17, at 227 (“Precisely because of the significant policy and fi-
nancial issues lurking behind every EAJA dispute, this statute has been the situs of 
closely fought litigation battles. . . . [V]irtually every paragraph and phrase in the sta-
tute has been the subject of litigation and nearly every word has been parsed by the 
courts in reported decisions.”). 
 48 See infra notes 50–63 and accompanying text. 
 49 Id. 
 50 E.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 
532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983); 
Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 n.4 (1980).  The legislative history also re-
flects this understanding.  See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 51 Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002) (“Under EAJA, a party prevail-
ing against the United States in court, including a successful Social Security benefits 
claimant, may be awarded fees . . . .”); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (“A plaintiff must be a 
‘prevailing party’ to recover an attorney’s fee under § 1988.”); see also id. at 441 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I also agree that plaintiffs may receive attorney’s fees for 
cases in which ‘they succeeded on any significant issue in litigation which achieves 
some of the benefits sought in bringing suit.’”). 
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stances, when the Court specifically addressed whether a party has ac-
tually prevailed, it has also used the individual client as the stand-in 
who must achieve actual success to “prevail” in the suit.  For example, 
the Court held in Buckhannon Board & Care Home v. West Virginia De-
partment of Health & Human Resources that a plaintiff is not entitled to 
fees when his lawsuit is rendered moot because the defendant 
stopped engaging in the offensive behavior as a result of the suit.
52
  In 
so holding, the Court made clear that its determination was based on 
the perspective of the client and not the attorney, stating that under 
its prior cases, “a ‘prevailing party’ is one who has been awarded 
some relief.”53  Relief is awarded for the benefit of the client, not his 
attorney.  Additionally, the Court, viewing the term “prevailing party” 
as a legal term of art, cited Black’s Law Dictionary to define a prevail-
ing party as a “party in whose favor judgment is rendered, regardless 
of the amount of damages awarded.”54  Also instructive in this particu-
lar instance is Justice Scalia’s concurrence, where he wrote, “[W]hen 
‘prevailing party’ is used by courts or legislatures in the context of a 
lawsuit, it is a term of art.  It has traditionally—and to my knowledge, 
prior to the enactment of the first statutes at issue here, invariably—
meant the party that wins the suit . . . .”55  The Court’s treatment of 
the term “prevailing party” in Buckhannon largely reinforces the idea 
that the term refers strictly to the individual seeking relief and not his 
counsel.  But because the nature of the dispute in Buckhannon is so 
easily distinguished from the current situation, the Court’s dicta 
there are hardly definitive here. 
The Court has touched on the question of the payable party 
more closely in cases involving disputes between the attorney and the 
client.  In Venegas v. Mitchell,
56
 an attorney sought to attain fees pur-
suant both to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and a contingency agreement with his 
client.  In reaching its decision, the Court held that “section 1988 
makes the prevailing party eligible for a discretionary award of attor-
ney’s fees” because “it is the party, rather than the lawyer, who is so 
 
 52 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001). 
 53 Id. at 603. 
 54 Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999)); see also id. at 628–29 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for using the Black’s definition and 
arguing that “[i]n prior cases, [the Court has] not treated Black’s Law Dictionary as 
preclusively definitive”).  The definition of “prevailing party” remains identical in the 
latest edition.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (9th ed. 2009). 
 55 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 56 495 U.S. 82 (1990). 
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eligible.”57  But dispositive as the language might seem as it relates to 
the payable party, the case primarily focused on the question of con-
tingent fees exceeding statutory awards.
58
  To the extent that the 
holding discussed the eligible party, it applied only to disputes over 
contingent fees and predefined contractual arrangements between a 
plaintiff and his attorney.
59
  The language indicating that the party 
should receive the fees in that circumstance does not automatically 
lead to the conclusion that the party should receive the fees directly 
in the current circumstance, when both the attorney and the client 
want payment directed to the attorney alone. 
The Court provided its most insightful precedent on the ques-
tion of the proper payable party in Evans v. Jeff D., where it held that a 
plaintiff has the authority to waive § 1988 attorney’s fees as part of a 
settlement agreement.
60
  In that case, the Court made the client the 
master of the attorney’s fees and held that “Congress bestowed upon 
the ‘prevailing party’ (generally plaintiffs) a statutory eligibility for a 
discretionary award of attorney’s fees in specified civil rights actions.  
It did not prevent the party from waiving this eligibility anymore than 
it legislated against assignment of this right to an attorney.”61  This 
holding makes clear that the right to fees belongs to the client and 
that the attorney is powerless to prevent the client from bargaining 
away attorney’s fee payments during the course of settlement negotia-
tions.
62
  The decision sidesteps the question of who could be an eligi-
ble recipient of the fees.  In fact, it explicitly states that the client re-
tains the right to assign attorney’s fees to his counsel.63 
The existing precedent makes clear that the client is the ulti-
mate decision maker regarding fees between client and attorney.  
 
 57 Id. at 87–88. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See id. at 89. 
 60 475 U.S. 717, 720 (1986). 
 61 Id. at 730−31. 
 62 See Martha Sherrill Davis, Attorney Fee Awards in Voting Rights Litigation, 34 S.D. 
L. REV. 303, 332–36 (1989); David Paul Enzminger, Note, Waive Goodbye to Law in the 
Public Interest—The Use of Coercive Fee Waivers in Civil Rights Actions, Evans v. Jeff. D., 
475 U.S. 717 (1986), 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 749, 757−59 (1987). 
 63 Under the current practice of the Social Security Administration, as seen in 
Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008), 
discussed infra Part III.A, the government will write a check to the client, care of the 
attorney.  The client can direct the funds as he chooses, and he may be under a con-
tractual obligation to assign them to his attorney.  But the client’s ability to assign the 
right does not speak to the willingness of the government or the court to enter the 
attorney as the direct recipient without using the client as an intermediary.   
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The recent line of cases, however, raises the question as to whether 
the statutory language precludes the client from requesting that the 
funds be payable directly to his attorney.  Noteworthy in the Supreme 
Court cases is the absence of consideration given to the identification 
of the proper recipient.  With the concern focusing on whether the 
client or the attorney is better suited to make decisions, the Court re-
peatedly determined that the client was the appropriate decision 
maker.  But the Court never addressed the question of what might 
happen if the plaintiff and the defendant disagreed.  In the past, par-
ties have litigated the amount of the fees owed or whether fees were 
owed at all, but because the burden of writing a check to an attorney 
rather than the client was so marginal, attorneys never litigated the 
determination of the proper recipient.
64
  Instead, courts did not be-
gin looking into the current question until losing parties started to 
dispute the appropriateness of direct payment to attorneys. 
III. THE EAJA PAYABLE-PARTY CIRCUIT SPLIT 
From the EAJA’s enactment in 1980 through 2005, only in li-
mited instances did parties litigate disputes over whether the proper 
payable party should be the client or his counsel.
65
  Many, if not most, 
of the recent cases presenting this question have been in the context 
of successful appeals from administrative denials of Social Security 
disability benefits, most likely because they are common and feature 
plaintiffs with disabilities who are more likely to face financial hard-
ship resulting in debts to the government.
66
 
 
 64 See infra Part III. 
 65 Before the Social Security Administration began requesting that EAJA fees be 
paid only to the client, the question was litigated almost exclusively in the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  See, e.g., 
FDL Techs., Inc. v. Nathan, 967 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that “the 
prevailing party, and not counsel, is entitled to attorney fees” when a military con-
tractor prevailed in a contract dispute against the Army); Phillips v. Gen. Serv. Ad-
min., 924 F.2d 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that fee awards should be made 
“to the ‘prevailing party,’ not the attorney”); see also Marre v. United States, 117 F.3d 
297, 304 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that “prevailing party” language in fee-shifting pro-
visions of federal tax statutes directs payment to the attorneys because “the prevailing 
party is only nominally the person who receives the award; the real party in interest 
vis-à-vis attorneys’ fees awarded under the statute are the attorneys themselves”) (cit-
ing Plant v. Blazer Fin. Serv., 598 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1979)).  No other court of ap-
peals addressed the question directly until King v. Commissioner of Social Security, 230 
F. App’x 476 (6th Cir. 2007).  
 66 In 2006, the Social Security Administration received 2,140,112 applications for 
disability benefits with an award rate of just 33.7 percent.  OFFICE OF RES., 
EVALUATION, AND STATISTICS, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE 
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Some older EAJA cases raised the payable-party question but did 
only indirectly.  In those cases, the question involved the standing of 
an attorney to independently request fees pursuant to a fee-shifting 
statute with “prevailing party” language.  An often-cited case in this 
area is Oguachuba v. INS, where the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that an attorney did not have standing to peti-
tion for fees and that when fees are available, the motion must be on 
the client’s behalf.67  But the resurgence of the payable-party question 
reopened Oguachuba to scrutiny.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit recently held that an attorney could bring a motion 
for fees on her own behalf, principally because the court concluded 
that she was the payable party and entitled to the fees.
68
  But while the 
standing question relates to the current question on the margins, it is 
the subject of a separate circuit split that is outside the scope of this 
Comment.
69
 
On the question of the proper payable party under the EAJA, 
circuit courts are split.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, 
Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits all take the position that 
the fees are payable only to the client.
70
  The U.S. Courts of Appeals 
for the Fifth and Eighth Circuits take the opposite position that the 
 
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 136 (2008), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2007/di_asr07.pdf.  For a de-
scription of the typical problems that face a Social Security disability claimant, see 
Morton Denlow, Substantial Evidence Review in Social Security Cases as an Issue of Fact, 28 
J. NAT’L ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 29, 29–39 (2008). 
 67 706 F.2d 93, 97 (1982) (“The claim that a denial of attorneys’ fees penalizes 
the lawyer but not the client exhibits a fundamental confusion about the nature of 
that relationship both in our legal system and under the EAJA.  Whether an award of 
attorneys’ fees under the Act ultimately redounds to the benefit of counsel depends 
upon the private contractual arrangements between the attorney and the client.”). 
 68 Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48 
(2009). 
 69 See Lowrance v. Hacker, 966 F.2d 1153, 1156 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing a 
split between the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals for the First and Second Circuits in an action for fees under the identical 
“prevailing party” language of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and stating the Seventh Circuit rule 
that an exception on standing for an attorney to request fees on his own behalf exists 
“where the lawyer is acting in his capacity as the client’s representative” because 
“whether the motion for fees is in the name of the party or his attorney truly is a 
‘technicality’” that places “form over substance”). 
 70 See Bryant v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 578 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2009); Stephens v. As-
true, 565 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2009); Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 2008), 
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009); Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008); FDL Techs., Inc. v. Nathan, 967 F.2d 1578 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992).  
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fees are payable directly to the attorney.
71
  Although these are the on-
ly circuit courts yet to decide the issue, district courts in all twelve cir-
cuits have confronted it.
72
 
A. Payment to the Client under Manning v. Astrue 
The leading case supporting the proposition that only the client 
can be a recipient of “prevailing party” attorney’s fees is Manning v. 
Astrue.
73
  There, the Tenth Circuit confronted two issues: “(1) wheth-
er attorney’s fees under the EAJA are payable to Ms. Manning or to 
her attorney and (2) if the attorney’s fees are payable to Ms. Man-
ning, whether the fees may be offset under the Debt Collection Im-
provement Act for an outstanding student loan debt . . . .”74  The fac-
tual background of Manning is common for these types of cases.  An 
administrative proceeding resulted in the denial of supplemental So-
cial Security income benefits for Manning.
75
  She appealed this denial 
to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma and 
prevailed.
76
  She moved for the payment of attorney’s fees under the 
EAJA, to which the Commissioner of Social Security did not object.
77
  
 
 71 See Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48 
(2009).  The Fifth Circuit has not yet answered the question with regard to the EAJA, 
but it has held that the “prevailing party” language under another statute permits 
payment directly to an attorney.  Marre v. United States, 117 F.3d 297, 304 (5th Cir. 
1997).  When taken with Supreme Court precedent holding that fee-shifting “prevail-
ing party” language interpretations are interchangeable between statutes, it should 
follow that the Fifth Circuit allows for EAJA payments to be paid directly to an attor-
ney.  See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 n.4 (2001); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 
(1983).  The government agrees with this position and “has treated Marre as preclud-
ing (within the Fifth Circuit) use of the offset mechanism to offset debts owed by the 
prevailing party against EAJA awards.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Ratliff v. 
Astrue, No. 08-1322 (U.S. June 25, 2009); see also Bean v. Barnhart, 473 F. Supp. 2d 
739, 743 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (in which the Social Security Administration appears to 
acquiesce to the attorney as a direct recipient). 
 72 See, e.g., Barber v. Astrue, No. CIV-S-00-1286 WBS DAD, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
65199 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2008); Woods v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV-07-76-B-W, 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27999 (D. Me. Apr. 3, 2008); Chonko v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
624 F. Supp. 2d 357 (D.N.J. 2008); Hogan v. Astrue, 539 F. Supp. 2d 680 (W.D.N.Y. 
2008).  Note that the only circuit where a district court has not yet addressed the is-
sue directly is the Fifth Circuit, which, for reasons discussed supra note 71, has likely 
concluded the question based on related precedent. 
 73 510 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008). 
 74 Id. at 1248. 
 75 Id. at 1247. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
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But when Manning received the attorney’s fees, she was given 
$1966.12 less than the award amount because of an administrative 
offset from the Department of Education for past-due student loans.
78
  
This offset was nearly one-third of the total $5958.30 attorney’s fee 
award.
79
  Manning’s counsel filed motions for the court to set aside 
the offset or to direct the fees specifically to Manning’s counsel ra-
ther than to Manning herself so that the debtless counsel could re-
ceive the full amount of the awarded fees.
80
  The district court denied 
both motions.
81
 
In deciding the proper recipient of the funds, the Tenth Circuit 
engaged in a multi-step process of evaluating the plain meaning of 
the statutory language, the way that courts have interpreted identical 
“prevailing party” language in other federal statutes, the EAJA’s legis-
lative history, the broader statutory framework relating to Social Se-
curity disability payments, and the standing arguments of Oguachu-
ba.
82
  On the question of the literal statutory language, Manning 
summarily concluded that the “statutory language clearly provides 
that the prevailing party, who incurred the attorney’s fees, and not 
that party’s attorney, is eligible for the attorney’s fees.”83  The court 
also examined how other courts have interpreted the “prevailing par-
ty” language in other statutes, but its examination was fairly cursory 
and did not add much to the analysis of the statutory language.
84
 
 
 78 Id. at 1247–48. 
 79 Manning, 510 F.3d at 1247. 
 80 Id. at 1248. 
 81 Id. 
 82 See id. at 1249–55. 
 83 Id. at 1249–50. 
 84 Supreme Court precedent on this matter does not directly address the ques-
tion of the payable party but often implies that the payable party is the client.  See su-
pra Part II.B.  The Manning court cited many of these precedents as support for the 
idea that the court should direct payment to the client rather than to  counsel.  
Manning, 510 F.3d at 1250–51.  But it appears that the Tenth Circuit may have exag-
gerated the weight of the precedent’s effect on the case.  For example, the court 
cited Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 796 (2002), as support for its assertion that 
“[u]nder EAJA, a party prevailing against the United States in court, including a suc-
cessful Social Security benefits claimant, may be awarded fees payable by the United 
States if the Government’s position in the litigation was not ‘substantially justified.’”  
Manning, 510 F.3d at 1249–50.  But an examination of the context surrounding the 
quoted portion indicates that the Court was paraphrasing rather than interpreting 
the statutory language.  See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.  Although the existing 
precedent does favor an approach that would award fees to the client, the Manning 
court might have exaggerated the merits of direct application of this precedent. 
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The court also evaluated the legislative history and determined 
that it supported an outcome in favor of directing the fees to the 
client.
85
  Specifically, the court examined the House Committee Re-
port, which stated that the EAJA “rests on the premise that certain 
individuals . . . may be deterred from seeking review of . . . unreason-
able governmental action because of the expense involved in secur-
ing a vindication of their rights,” and concluded that “[t]his state-
ment of purpose directly addresses the question whether the EAJA 
fees are for the claimant or for the claimant’s attorney and clearly 
states that the fees are for the claimant.”86 
Perhaps the most compelling portion of the court’s analysis is its 
treatment of Manning’s argument that “uncodified portions of the 
EAJA anticipate that her attorney will receive the EAJA fee award.”87  
In her argument, Manning pointed to a separate attorney’s fee provi-
sion contained within the Social Security appeals law itself.
88
  When a 
claimant prevails in a Social Security disability appeal, “the court may 
determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total past-due bene-
fits to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judg-
ment . . . .”89  Manning argued that this language unambiguously di-
rects the fees to the attorney.
90
  She further suggested that an 
uncodified Savings Provision of the EAJA specifically states that fees 
awarded pursuant to the Social Security Act “shall not prevent an 
award of fees and other expenses” under the EAJA but that if a clai-
mant’s attorney “receives fees for the same work” under both sec-
tions, she must “refund[] to the claimant the amount of the smaller 
fee.”91  Manning argued that because the statute could potentially 
have required the attorney to be responsible for refunding the EAJA 
 
 85 Manning, 510 F.3d at 1251–52. 
 86 Id. at 1251 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 5–6 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4984). 
 87 Id.  
 88 Id. at 1251–52. 
 89 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (2006).  Prevailing parties often disfavor this fee pro-
vision because it only allows the court to “certify the amount of such fee for payment 
to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due bene-
fits.”  Id.  Fees pursuant to the EAJA, on the other hand, represent genuine fee shift-
ing, where the attorney receives extra payment from the government based on the 
work performed rather than simple apportionment of some benefits won in the suit. 
 90 Manning, 510 F.3d at 1251–52. 
 91 Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 183, 186 (amending Act of Oct. 
21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 206, 94 Stat. 2321, 2330). 
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fees, Congress therefore envisioned the attorney as the proper reci-
pient.
92
  The court did not find this argument persuasive and held 
that the provision served only to help avoid double compensation, 
and that it “does not state that the attorney is entitled to receive the 
full amount of the EAJA fees awarded.”93 
Furthermore, the court suggested that the Social Security past-
due benefits provision was evidence that Congress intended the 
client, and not the attorney, to be the direct recipient under the 
EAJA.
94
  The past-due benefits provision directs a “fee for payment to 
such attorney” and thus unambiguously designates the attorney as the 
beneficiary of the fee payment.
95
  The court viewed this language as 
indicative of “Congress know[ing] what language to use to award at-
torney’s fees to an attorney and what language to use when it chooses 
to award the fees to the prevailing party.”96  Under the Manning 
court’s view, even if the “prevailing party” language of the EAJA is de-
rived from a boilerplate formula for fee-shifting in federal statutes, 
Congress has demonstrated a capability of deviating from that formu-
la to make the distinction between party and counsel.
97
  In the case of 
the EAJA and other “prevailing party” statutes, Congress chose the 
term “party” rather than “attorney” to denote the recipient. 
In its analysis, the court also looked to Oguachuba v. INS,
98
 where 
the Second Circuit considered a motion that an attorney made for 
EAJA fees on his own behalf, rather than on behalf of his client.
99
  
The Second Circuit, without reaching a decision on the issue of the 
properly payable party, dismissed the claim upon a finding that coun-
sel lacked standing to pursue fees himself.
100
  The Manning court in-
terpreted this decision as a validation of treating the client as the 
proper recipient, reasoning that if the attorney had a direct claim to 
the fees, he would have had standing to bring the motion.
101
  The 
 
 92 Manning, 510 F.3d at 1251. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 1252. 
 95 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 96 Manning, 510 F.3d at 1252. 
 97 Id. 
 98 706 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 99 Id. at 97–98. 
 100 Id. at 98. 
 101 Manning, 510 F.3d at 1252.  Although the Second Circuit has not yet ruled on 
the appropriate payable party, some district courts in the Second Circuit have treated 
Oguachuba as settling the question in favor of direct client payments.  See, e.g., Marti-
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court also placed particular reliance on Panola Land Buying Ass’n v. 
Clark,
102
 where the Eleventh Circuit held that a prevailing party’s for-
mer attorney could not claim EAJA fees when the client was willing to 
enter a settlement agreement that included a fee-waiver provision.
103
 
In closing, the court acknowledged that for most of the EAJA’s 
history, the dominant practice was to pay the attorneys directly; even 
the government, the court noted, seemed to change its position on 
the proper recipient during the course of litigation.
104
  But the court 
held that in light of “the statutory language, legislative history, and 
case law,” it was required to direct payment to the client, even though 
the practice “seems counter intuitive.”105  The court proceeded to ad-
dress briefly the issue of the Debt Collection Improvement Act and 
held that all judgments against the government are subject to auto-
matic debt deductions unless a specific exception in the Act applies.
106
  
Because the EAJA is not listed as such an exception, an offset of 
Manning’s attorney’s fee award to pay her student-loan debts was 
permissible.
107
 
B. Payment to the Attorney Under Ratliff v. Astrue 
At this time, only one circuit favors direct payment to the attor-
ney.  In Ratliff v. Astrue, the Eighth Circuit held that EAJA attorney’s 
fees should go directly to the attorney and that government offsets of 
the fees against the client’s government debts are therefore imper-
missible.
108
  In Ratliff, attorney Catherine Ratliff successfully 
represented two clients who won attorney’s fees under the EAJA that 
were subject to partial offsets as a result of the clients’ debts to the 
government.
109
  Ratliff filed a suit on her own behalf against the Social 
Security Administration and claimed that because she was the proper 
recipient of the attorney’s fees under the EAJA, the award reduction 
 
no v. Astrue, No. 07-CV-0941, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1446, at *7–8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan 9, 
2009). 
 102 844 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 103 Manning, 510 F.3d at 1251. 
 104 Id. at 1255. 
 105 Id.  
 106 Id. at 1255–56. 
 107 Id.  
 108 540 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009) . 
 109 Id. 
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represented an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
110
  The 
district court dismissed her case, holding that she did not have stand-
ing to sue the government because the client is the appropriate reci-
pient of attorney’s fees under the EAJA; therefore, the court rea-
soned, Ratliff had no legal entitlement to the fees that the 
government offset and did not suffer an injury-in-fact.
111
 
The Eighth Circuit reversed in a brief opinion containing a sur-
prising amount of equivocation on the issue.
112
  The court held that 
the attorney’s fees are awarded to the attorney and not the client, but 
it made this decision because of peculiar in-circuit precedent.
113
  Spe-
cifically, the court cited to two cases in which it held that third-party 
judgment creditors cannot recover EAJA attorney’s fees and that an 
Internal Revenue Code fee-shifting statute provided for government 
payment to the attorney rather than for an offset of taxes owed.
114
  
The court reasoned that because both of these precedents favor pay-
ment of the attorney over payment of the client’s debts, “EAJA fee 
awards become the property of the prevailing party’s attorney when 
assessed and may not be used to offset the claimant’s debt.”115  The 
court acknowledged that it might have reached a different conclusion 
if the case were one of first impression, but it indicated that it was 
constrained by Eighth Circuit precedent.
116
 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Gruender made a compelling 
argument that although in-circuit precedent required payment to the 
 
 110 Ratliff v. Astrue, No. 06-5070-RHB, 2007 WL 6894710, at *1 (D.S.D. May 10, 
2007), rev’d, 540 F.3d 800, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48.  The Ratliff case is unique in this 
respect.  In most other cases, the issue arises when the attorney makes the initial mo-
tion for attorney’s fees under the EAJA.  Here, however, the attorney sued on her 
own behalf after her clients’ awards were offset.  Id.  Therefore, the precise question 
in Ratliff focused on the properly payable party in the context of whether the attor-
ney had sufficient injury to file a direct claim against the government; most other 
cases typically revolve around which party should be paid if the court chooses to 
award fees.  See Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 3, at 15–18 (acknowledging the unique procedural posture of Ratliff as 
compared to other EAJA payable-party cases); Reply Brief for the Petitioner in Sup-
port of Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Ratliff v. Astrue, No. 08-1322 (U.S. June 
25, 2009) (same).  Although the procedural posture of the case is different, the legal 
issues are essentially identical. 
 111 Ratliff, 2007 WL 6894710, at *1. 
 112 See Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 801–02. 
 113 Id. at 802. 
 114 Id. (citing Curtis v. City of Des Moines, 995 F.2d 125, 129 (8th Cir. 1993); Unit-
ed States v. McPeck, 910 F.2d 509, 514 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
 115 Id. at 802.  
 116 Id. 
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attorney, the holding is nevertheless “inconsistent with language in 
two Supreme Court opinions, the EAJA’s plain language, and the 
holdings of most other circuit courts.”117  Judge Gruender argued that 
both Evans v. Jeff D., with its allowance of prevailing party discretion 
in handling attorney’s fees, and Venegas v. Mitchell, with its statement 
that an attorney’s fee award under § 1988 belongs to the client rather 
than the attorney, indicate that an outcome for direct payment to the 
client should ensue.
118
  Judge Gruender further argued that, especial-
ly considering Congress’s explicit direction of attorney’s fees to at-
torneys in other statutes, the plain language of the EAJA favors pay-
ment to the party rather than to counsel.
119
  Although he concurred 
in the opinion because of binding Eighth Circuit precedent, Judge 
Gruender’s concurring opinion strongly suggests that he would have 
favored payment to the client if the case appeared as a matter of first 
impression.
120
 
Prior to Ratliff, the most significant opinion in support of paying 
the attorney directly was King v. Commissioner of Social Security.
121
  King 
was one of the first cases to address this issue, and although it is an 
unpublished decision, it figures prominently in subsequent district 
court opinions rendering the same outcome.
122
  In King, the plaintiff 
filed an application for supplemental Social Security income, which 
the Commissioner denied administratively.
123
  The U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Ohio reversed and deemed that the 
Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.124 
 
 117 Id. at 803 (Gruender, J., concurring). 
 118 Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 803 (citing Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 88 (1990); 
Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730 (1986)). 
 119 Id. at 803–04 (Gruender, J., concurring). 
 120 See id. at 805.  On September 30, 2009, the Supreme Court granted a petition 
for a writ of certiorari.  130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).   
 121 230 F. App’x 476 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 122 See, e.g., Ratliff, 540 F.3d at 805 (Gruender, J., concurring); Williams v. Comm’r 
of Soc. Sec., 549 F. Supp. 2d 613, 621 (D.N.J. 2008); Pegg v. Astrue, No. 7:07-221-
KKC, 2008 WL 2038871, at *4 (E.D. Ky. May 12, 2008); see also Hogan v. Astrue, 539 
F. Supp. 2d 680, 683 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (acknowledging King as the leading circuit de-
cision to pay the attorney but declining to follow it). 
 123 King, 230 F. App’x at 477.   
 124 Id.  Unlike Manning, the decision in King featured numerous ancillary issues 
for the Court to consider, including whether the notice of appeal was filed in a time-
ly manner and whether King’s attorney filed for fees on her own behalf or on behalf 
of King.  Id. at 478–80.  The court could have rejected the claim due to a lack of 
standing if the attorney was seeking fees on her own behalf, but the court deter-
mined that the attorney was acting for King when she made the motion even though 
an “inartfully styled” brief made it a close call.  Id. at 482. 
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The court approached the question by first examining the Fed-
eral Circuit’s decision in Phillips v. General Service Administration,125 
where the question of whether EAJA fees are payable to a client or an 
attorney first arose.
126
  The Phillips court issued a somewhat murky 
opinion, holding that an “attorney could not directly claim or be en-
titled to the award” but that “there must also be an express or im-
plied agreement that the fee award will be paid over to the legal rep-
resentative.”127  To a certain extent, the Phillips decision was a 
compromise; the court held that the fee was payable to the client but 
that the client must promptly surrender the fee to the attorney.
128
  In 
addition to the Federal Circuit case, the Sixth Circuit examined the 
prevailing circuit practice and the long-term stance of the Commis-
sioner.
129
  In many cases, Sixth Circuit courts included language di-
recting attorney’s fees to the prevailing party’s counsel without any 
consideration of whether she was the proper recipient and without 
objection from the Commissioner.
130
  The court weighed the 
longstanding disposition of the Commissioner, previous Sixth Circuit 
treatment of the issue, and the Phillips dicta, and it concluded that 
EAJA fees are payable to the attorney at the request of the party.
131
 
IV. THE APPROPRIATE DEFINITION, THE FULL SCOPE OF POTENTIAL 
IMPLICATIONS, AND THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
The disagreement between the courts is not based on competing 
policy interests or different interpretations of the statutory language.  
Instead, courts consistently look at the same group of factors and 
 
 125 924 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 126 King, 230 F. App’x at 481. 
 127 Phillips, 924 F.2d at 1582–83. 
 128 The Phillips case represents an anomaly in that it straddled the two possible 
outcomes by directing the funds to the client while going out of its way to emphasize 
that the fees are not the client’s to keep.  Proponents of paying the attorney directly 
and proponents of paying only the client have both pointed to Phillips for support.  
See Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 2007); King, 230 F. App’x at 
481.  But despite the mixed message of Phillips, the Federal Circuit clarified its posi-
tion in FDL Technologies, Inc. v. Nathan, 967 F.2d 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1992), where it 
unambiguously held that the client is the proper recipient of EAJA fees.  In a dissent-
ing opinion, Judge Newman wrote that she “can not support the improvident action . 
. . which assured in the circumstances that the attorney fee award, although paid by 
the government, would never reach the attorney.”  Id. at 1582 (Newman, J., dissent-
ing). 
 129 King, 230 F. App’x at 481–82. 
 130 See, e.g., Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 82 F. App’x 453, 456 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 131 King, 230 F. App’x at 482. 
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weigh their relative importance.  These factors can be summarized as 
including the statutory language, the legislative history, the policy in-
centives, and prior prevailing court practice. 
A. Different Factors Point to Different Outcomes 
When courts choose to follow the statutory language, as Manning 
explicitly did, the resulting interpretation invariably favors paying the 
client rather than the attorney.
132
  The EAJA states, “[A] court may 
award reasonable fees and expenses of attorneys . . . to the prevailing 
party in any civil action brought by or against the United States.”133  
The use of the term “prevailing party” appears to refer exclusively to 
the plaintiff; the statute directs courts to award the fees to the party 
and not the party’s representative.  The language does not discuss the 
attorney as an individual; instead, it points to the fees of the attorney 
and directs the funds to the party in the suit.
134
 
Aside from the operative language, two other inferences drawn 
from the statute further support the idea of the client being the only 
permissible recipient.  First, the EAJA uses the “prevailing party” lan-
guage when referring to costs incurred from sources other than an 
attorney, such as an expert witness.
135
  Because an attorney and her 
client are in a representative and fiduciary relationship, a statute 
could potentially refer concurrently to both when discussing the 
“party.”  But when the same statute refers to the “prevailing party” as 
the recipient of costs for expert witnesses, the term can only refer to 
the plaintiff because the expert witness and the plaintiff have no such 
 
 132 See, e.g., Bryant v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 578 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2009) 
(“[W]e are persuaded by the plain language of the EAJA and conclude that the pre-
vailing party . . . is the proper recipient of attorney fees under the EAJA.”); Stephens 
ex. rel. R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 140 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hile we may be sympa-
thetic to the concerns raised by Stephens, sympathy does not permit us to ignore the 
plain language of the statute.”); Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he statute’s explicit reference to the ‘prevailing party’ unambiguously directs 
the award of attorney’s fees to the party who incurred those fees and not to the par-
ty’s attorney.”), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009); Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 
1249–50 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008) (“[T]his statutory lan-
guage clearly provides that the prevailing party, who incurred the attorney’s fees, and 
not that party’s attorney, is eligible for an award of attorney’s fees.”); see also Ratliff v. 
Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 803 (8th Cir. 2008)(Gruender, J., concurring) (“[O]ur conclu-
sion that EAJA attorney’s fees are awarded to a prevailing party’s attorney also con-
tradicts the plain language of the EAJA.”). 
 133 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 134 See id. 
 135 § 2412(a)(1). 
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fiduciary or representative relationship.
136
  Second, with most of these 
cases arising under the umbrella of Social Security disability appeals, 
the actual statute providing for those appeals is instructive.  The So-
cial Security Act directs the court to “certify the amount of such fee 
for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount 
of such past-due benefits.”137  This demonstrates that, notwithstanding 
the frequent use of the boilerplate “prevailing party” language, Con-
gress has shown the ability to draft statutes explicitly directing fees 
straight to the attorney.
138
  Given that Congress has demonstrated the 
capability of making this distinction, little basis exists for viewing the 
term “prevailing party” as reaching the attorney. 
Some plaintiffs have argued that the Savings Provision of the 
EAJA―which indicates that when an attorney receives fees under 
both the EAJA and the Social Security Act, she must refund the 
smaller amount―supports the idea that Congress envisioned the at-
torney as the recipient of both.
139
  While a court may be tempted to 
read past the Savings Provision and simply take the operative “prevail-
ing party” language at face value, such a reading is problematic be-
cause the operative language and the Savings Provision are irrecon-
cilable.  The operative language directs the funds to the “prevailing 
party” while the Savings Provision indicates that “where the clai-
mant’s attorney receives fees for the same work under [the Social Se-
curity Act] and [the EAJA], the claimant’s attorney refunds to the 
 
 136 In some other statutes with the same “prevailing party” language, the attorney’s 
fees provision is not separated from the miscellaneous-costs provision as it is in the 
EAJA.  For example, the fee-shifting provision of the Voting Rights Act permits “the 
court, in its discretion, [to] allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee, 
reasonable expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses as costs.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973l(e) (2006).  In this context, the statute cannot be read to imply that the at-
torney is the “prevailing party” because the attorney’s fees are not segregated from 
other fees as they are in the EAJA, but they are instead lumped in combination with 
miscellaneous costs.  For the term “party” to encompass the attorney in this situation, 
it would need to have two meanings at once.  Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 
S. Ct. 2783, 2794 (2008) (“It would be rather like saying ‘He filled and kicked the 
bucket’ to mean ‘He filled the bucket and died.’”).  While this could mean that Con-
gress had a separate intent for the two statutes, such intent is not relevant consider-
ing the Supreme Court’s statements that all “prevailing party” language in federal 
statutes should be treated the same.  See sources cited supra note 50. 
 137 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 138 See id. 
 139 Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 183, 186 (amending Act of Oct. 
21, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-481, § 206, 94 Stat. 2321, 2330); see Manning v. Astrue, 510 
F.3d 1246, 1253–54 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 (2008). 
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claimant the amount of the smaller fee.”140  No explanation for this 
discrepancy is particularly satisfying.  One possibility is that Congress 
simply erred in drafting the statute.  Another is that because the So-
cial Security Act payments are capped at twenty-five percent of past-
due benefits, Congress drafted the language envisioning that the So-
cial Security payments would always be smaller.
141
  But if this were the 
case, Congress would have probably ordered the refund of the Social 
Security Act fees rather than the smaller of the two.  The third possi-
bility is that Congress added the Savings Provision while operating 
under the assumption that the fees would continue to be paid to the 
attorney directly and that the Savings Provision merely represented 
the first codification of this practice.
142
  Such an explanation is possi-
ble but peculiar considering that the Savings Provision is silent on the 
direction of the initial fee payments and instead relates only to the 
subsequent refund.  The House Report on the Savings Provision indi-
cates that Congress may have simply assumed that the EAJA already 
paid funds directly to the attorney.
143
  But in the context of a fee-
shifting provision, courts may not need to interpret the term “party” 
so narrowly.
144
 
In this particular context, the argument can be made that the 
proper emphasis within the EAJA’s language instead rests with the 
term “prevailing.”  The purpose of the statute is to ensure that the 
losing party pays the costs of the prevailing party.  By contrast, in the 
aforementioned § 406 language explicitly shifting some past-due 
benefits to the attorney, the statute envisions a situation where a 
client and attorney have already prevailed and begin assessing fee 
payments.
145
  By that point, the only possible dispute is between client 
 
 140 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (2006); § 3, 99 Stat. at 186. 
 141 See supra note 89. 
 142 For a compelling argument in support of the theory that Congress functionally 
used the Savings Provision amendment to codify the payment of fees to the attorney, 
see Stephens v. Astrue, 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 806–10 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 565 F.3d 131 
(4th Cir. 2009). 
 143 H.R. REP. NO. 99-120, at 7 (1985), as reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 135–36 
(“The bill clarifies that an EAJA award in Social Security cases is not precluded by the 
fee provision in the Social Security Act[] . . . . The bill also prohibits attorneys from 
collecting both EAJA fees and Sec. 406(b) fees in the same case.”).   
 144 See Anna L. Chambers, Comment, Equal Access to Justice Act Cuts Off Equal Access 
for Social Security Claimants: Reeves v. Barnhart, 12 JONES L. REV. 93, 106–07 (2007) 
(arguing that “the use of the phrase ‘prevailing party’ cannot be used as conclusive 
evidence that Congress intending [sic] the EAJA check to be payable to the clai-
mant”). 
 145 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
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and counsel.  Bearing in mind a purpose of genuine fee shifting be-
tween adverse parties, the term “party” could potentially distinguish 
the two sides of the case rather than the prevailing client and his at-
torney.  Taking the EAJA’s “prevailing” emphasis in conjunction with 
the congressional goal of effectuating attorneys’ payments, the term 
“party” can reasonably include, without a significant logical leap, 
both the attorney and her client together and thus permit a court to 
exercise its discretion to direct fees to counsel rather than client.  Cu-
riously, no court appears to have embraced or explored this interpre-
tation of the statute’s language, as those favoring payment to the at-
torney have instead relied upon other considerations.
146
  
Nevertheless, the statute’s straightforward language might not actual-
ly be as straightforward as it first appears. 
Aside from the statutory language, many courts will also look to 
the EAJA’s legislative history to gain an understanding of precisely 
who is intended to be the fee recipient.  The legislative history, how-
ever, is completely silent on the question.  When legislative reports 
discuss the “prevailing party,” they deal exclusively with determining 
the requirements for a party to prevail.
147
  The silence in the legisla-
tive history demonstrates a broader problem with the “prevailing par-
ty” language in fee-shifting statutes: no one seems to have anticipated 
disputes arising as a result of a client desiring direct payment to his 
attorney while the adverse party demands direct payment to the 
client.
148
  After all, as an abstract matter, whether the direct recipient 
is the party or the counsel should make no difference, and from a 
drafter’s standpoint, the situation where the client is litigating to 
avoid personal acceptance of the government’s fee payments is diffi-
cult to imagine. 
The reason for this conflict is the Debt Collection Improvement 
Act, which takes advantage of the client’s use of the fee-shifting provi-
 
 146 Some courts adopt an approach of paying the attorney by emphasizing con-
gressional intent as a superceding factor over the plain meaning of the language, but 
none has attempted to interpret the plain meaning of the statute as permitting direct 
attorney payment without an assignment.  See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 147 See supra Part II.A. 
 148 The risk of unintended and unforeseen consequences has been generally rec-
ognized in the past and represents one of the most significant problems with the use 
of legislative history as an interpretive tool.  See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory In-
terpretation in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983) 
(“Most canons of statutory construction go wrong not because they misconceive the 
nature of judicial interpretation or of the legislative or political process but because 
they impute omniscience to Congress.  Omniscience is always an unrealistic assump-
tion, and particularly so when one is dealing with the legislative process.”). 
FISCHETTI (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2010  4:59 PM 
2010] COMMENT 747 
 
sion by reshifting the fees back to the government to satisfy the 
client’s debts.149  In the relevant portions, the Act provides that after 
satisfying certain procedural thresholds, the Department of the Trea-
sury is entitled to offset any government payment issued to the debtor 
so long as the payment source is not exempted.
150
  Social Security 
past-due benefits are not wholly exempt from offset, but they are sub-
ject to special rules that exempt the first $9000 of benefits received 
each year.
151
  Therefore, when an indebted claimant succeeds in a suit 
to obtain past-due benefits, the government will often find itself una-
ble to deduct funds from the relief and instead must resort to recov-
ery through the fee award.
152
 
The legislative history makes clear that the purpose of the EAJA 
is to facilitate private litigation against the federal government and 
the weight of its resources by providing compensation to prevailing 
parties.
153
  But payment to client or counsel accomplishes this policy 
goal because payment to either will result in the alleviation of the 
client’s debts.  The legislative history therefore provides no real basis 
for determining the appropriately payable party.  As a result, both 
sides of the dispute frequently claim the legislative history in support 
of their positions.
154
 
As a result of the legislative history’s malleability, many courts 
that favor directing payment to the attorney instead focus on the pol-
 
 149 See 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (2006); see also Hines v. Astrue, No. 3:05-CV-02416-KOB, 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96985, at *8–9 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2007) (“Under the pro-
posed practice, the government can refuse to pay Social Security benefits without 
substantial justification yet suffer no true penalty because the EAJA fees that it is re-
quired to pay out one day as a penalty can be seized the next.”). 
 150 § 3716.  The source of the debt is mostly immaterial, so long as a state or the 
federal government is the creditor.  FIN. MGMT. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
2001 FEDERAL DEBT COLLECTION & SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENT GUIDE 1 (2001) (on file 
with author) (listing student loans, Farm Service Agency and Rural Development 
Agency loans, and Food Stamp overpayment as “the most common delinquent feder-
al non-tax debts owed”).   
 151 § 3716(c)(3)(C). 
 152 See supra note 89. 
 153 See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text. 
 154 Compare Stephens v. Astrue, 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809 (D. Md. 2008) (“[A] con-
struction of the EAJA that effects windfall payments to individual Social Security 
claimants and reduces the availability of counsel for future claimants not only thwarts 
Congress’s intent, but also is an irrational and unfair result.”), rev’d, 565 F.3d 131 
(4th Cir. 2009), with Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he legislative history for the EAJA also makes it clear that certain prevailing par-
ties, and not their attorneys, may recover attorney’s fees . . . .”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
486 (2008). 
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icy incentives underlying the EAJA.
155
  No compelling policy argu-
ment genuinely supports paying the client rather than the attorney.  
Such a payment scheme runs contrary to even the client’s interest.  
When the client has other outstanding debts, the client still benefits 
from immediately paying the attorney’s invoice with fees that the 
court designates for that purpose.  When no debt exists, the attorney 
still has a contractual entitlement to the fees and no benefit is gained 
when the client must act as an intermediary between the court and 
counsel.  Any argument in favor of paying preexisting loans before 
paying new debts that the plaintiff incurs as a result of the litigation 
ignores the fact that the fees awarded are attorney’s fees that the court 
granted to the plaintiff in the specific amount owed to counsel and 
for the specific purpose of paying counsel.  No court would support 
an outcome whereby a client uses court-ordered attorney’s fees to pay 
credit card debts, mortgages, or utility bills while the attorney still 
awaits payment.  Yet ironically, the Debt Collection Improvement Act 
commands this outcome.  Even though fees are labeled as attorney’s 
fees, they are effectively used to pay the client’s other debts.  Even 
many courts deciding in favor of paying the client rather than the at-
torney acknowledge that the decision is a result of the statutory lan-
guage and that the more sensible policy decision would be to direct 
payment to the attorney.
156
 
Courts holding for direct payment to the attorney have almost 
universally relied on policy arguments.
157
  These courts often combine 
the policy arguments with references to the longstanding practice of 
paying the attorney directly or use the Savings Provision to construe 
the statute as permitting direct payment to the attorney; however, the 
policy arguments always remain central.
158
In some instances, courts 
candidly admit that they will order payment to the attorney directly, 
notwithstanding the contradictory statutory language, because of the 
 
 155 See infra notes 157–59 and accompanying text. 
 156 See, e.g., Manning, 510 F.3d at 1255 (describing as “counter intuitive” the deci-
sion “that an award of attorney’s fees does not go to the attorney”); Reeves v. Astrue, 
526 F.3d 732, 738 (11th Cir. 2008) (“All this, Reeves contends, is bad public policy.  
He may well be right, but policy decisions are properly left to Congress, not the 
courts.”). 
 157 See, e.g., Vargas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-3586 (KSH), 2008 WL 699581, at 
*3–5 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2008). 
 158 See, e.g., King v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 230 F. App’x 476, 481 (6th Cir. 2007); 
Stephens v. Astrue, 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 814 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 565 F.3d 131 (4th 
Cir. 2009). 
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policy issues’ overwhelming weight.  For example, one court, in 
granting fees to the attorney directly, stated, 
 The decisions siding with the Commissioner have primarily re-
lied on the principle of statutory construction which holds that 
courts should apply the plain meaning of a statute when the statu-
tory language is clear and unambiguous.  However, these courts, 
for the most part, have ignored a less often cited, but equally im-
portant, principle of statutory construction which holds that when 
the literal application of statutory language would either produce 
an outcome demonstrably at odds with the statute’s purpose or 
would result in an absurd outcome, courts are entitled to look 
beyond the plain meaning of the statutory language. 
 The literal application of [the EAJA] in this case undeniably 
leads to bizarre and absurd results.
159
 
This statement on statutory interpretation is correct and de-
serves some consideration,
160
 but it is not applicable here.  While it is 
true that courts will “rewrite” statutes when the application of the 
strict statutory language blatantly contradicts the purpose of the sta-
tute, the ordinary circumstances for such a finding usually involve a 
particularly bizarre outcome when the facts are applied to the law lit-
erally.
161
  Although the argument for paying only the client is largely 
impractical, it is still in harmony with the goals of the EAJA when 
considering those goals in conjunction with the goals of the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act.
162
  Specifically, the outcome of paying 
the client is not so one sided when considering that Congress has 
 
 159 Williams v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 549 F. Supp. 2d 613, 616 (D.N.J. 2008) (in-
ternal citations omitted); see also Quade v. Barnhart, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1171–72 
(D. Ariz. 2008) (explaining that payment only to the client would render an “absurd 
result” and should not be permitted). 
 160 See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 845, 850–53 (1992) (defending judicial use of legislative history to help 
avoid absurd results and to rectify drafting errors); Louis Fisher, Statutory Construc-
tion: Keeping a Respectful Eye on Congress, 53 SMU L. REV. 49, 49–52, 65–67 (2000) (dis-
cussing different court approaches to statutory construction). 
 161 See generally, e.g., Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (1991) (permitting 
convicted prisoners to recover witness fees even though the statute technically prec-
ludes it because they are appearing pursuant to subpoenas); Green v. Bock Laundry 
Mach. Co., 590 U.S. 504 (1989) (procedural protections with regard to admissibility 
of prior felony convictions for defendants in the Federal Rules of Evidence permitted 
to apply to civil plaintiffs). 
 162 See Chonko v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 624 F. Supp. 2d 357, 366 (D.N.J.  2008) 
(“The Court acknowledges that allowing the government to use statutory offsets to 
reduce its EAJA payments may frustrate EAJA’s purpose.  But it is equally true that 
such practices serve the purposes of those statutory offsets: to allow the federal gov-
ernment to collect debts owed to it.”). 
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permitted offsets as a revenue-raising technique.
163
  Congress may 
have balanced the competing factors and simply felt that the policy 
goals of the Debt Collection Improvement Act outweighed the policy 
goals of the EAJA.  Few would likely support this balance, as it defeats 
the EAJA entirely in some situations and serves only the purpose of 
raising relatively meager amounts of revenue
164
 through the fee-
shifting statutes.  But it would be incorrect to argue that the offsets 
further no policy goal whatsoever, even in this situation, given that 
they do serve a legitimate revenue-raising purpose. 
In addition to the statutory language, legislative history, and pol-
icy considerations, courts often consider Supreme Court precedent 
with regard to the payment of attorney’s fees.  Courts on both sides of 
the dispute have cited existing precedent to support their holdings.  
While proponents of paying the attorney point to the longstanding 
practice of paying the attorneys and the actions of the Commissioner 
in earlier cases, proponents of paying only the client point to court 
rulings on the identical “prevailing party” language of civil rights sta-
tutes.
165
  But the approach of looking to prior court practice on pay-
ment of fees is flawed because it avoids the fact that for a great deal of 
time, parties did not litigate the proper recipient issue, which was in-
stead a matter of consent between the parties.
166
  In some past in-
stances, parties litigated the question in the civil-rights context,
167
 but 
in most cases, the parties consent to who is the appropriate fund re-
 
 163 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) (2006); 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (2006). 
 164 In the fiscal year 2007, all administrative-offset collections accounted for a total 
of $179 million.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FISCAL YEAR 2007 REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS: U.S. GOVERNMENT RECEIVABLES AND DEBT COLLECTION ACTIVITIES OF 
FEDERAL AGENCIES 12 (2008), available at http://www.fms.treas.gov/news/reports/ 
debt07.pdf. 
 165 See Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 735–36 (11th Cir. 2008); supra notes 84, 138 
and accompanying text. 
 166 Richardson v. Penfold, 900 F.2d 116, 117 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Technically the 
award of attorney’s fees under section 1988 is to the party, not to his lawyer, but it is 
common to make the award directly to the lawyer where, as in this case, the lawyer’s 
contractual entitlement is uncontested.”).  With the issue remaining uncontested for 
so long, the Commissioner essentially acquiesced for decades to the idea of paying an 
attorney directly under the EAJA and only recently began to take a vociferous posi-
tion in favor of the literal language.  See Vargas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-3586 
(KSH), 2008 WL 699581, at *8 n.4 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2008) (holding for payment di-
rectly to attorney and pointing out that “[t]wo of the ‘claimant as prevailing party’ 
cases . . . are decades old and unpersuasive enough that up until now, the govern-
ment did not follow them”).  
 167 See Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d Cir. 1977) (“Of course, since 
the object of fee awards is not to provide a windfall to individual plaintiffs, fee awards 
must accrue to counsel.”). 
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cipient and litigate whether payment of those funds is proper in the 
first place.  Also, the absence of a direct question likely lured some 
courts into a degree of complacency with regard to terminology.  In 
one early case, when a district court granted payment to the plain-
tiff’s attorney, it wrote that a “clerical mistake” was responsible for 
the court’s original decision to direct fees to the plaintiff rather than 
counsel.
168
 
The most relevant and substantive precedents in this area in-
volve interpretation of the phrase “prevailing party” in federal fee-
shifting statutes.
169
  Although the Supreme Court has never directly 
addressed the issue of which party is properly payable under any 
“prevailing party” statute, it has addressed some issues on the margins 
that might favor an approach of treating the client as the proper re-
cipient under the EAJA.
170
  In earlier “prevailing party” statutes, how-
ever, the opposition was often another private party or a state or local 
government who sought no offsets from the attorney’s fee award.  
Recovering from the federal government is unique because the Debt 
Collection Improvement Act presents a new policy problem that does 
not exist in the other cases.  Nevertheless, the possibility of offsets 
should not change the meaning of “prevailing party” in the EAJA.171  
The reason that offsets have taken place in EAJA cases but not in cas-
es involving other fee-shifting statutes is not because the EAJA’s lan-
guage is unique, but because the EAJA invariably produces payments 
from the federal government rather than private parties.
172
  The dif-
ferent treatment for attorney’s fees from the federal government is 
not a result of internal interpretation of the EAJA; rather, it 
 
 168 Dixon-Townsell v. Barnhart, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1284 (N.D. Okla. 2006), 
overruled by Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 
S. Ct. 486 (2008). 
 169 See supra Part II.B. 
 170 See id. 
 171 Note that the major Supreme Court precedents all involve issues of whether a 
party can be considered to have prevailed, and if he has, what his rights are when 
handling the fees.  The term “prevailing party” could potentially have a different 
meaning between statutes with regard to payment rights even though it has the same 
meaning with regard to “the standards for awarding fees.”  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 
U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94-1011, at 4 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912).  But such a possibility seems contrary to the traditional 
practice of treating identical language in separate statutes alike.  But see Sisk, supra 
note 17, at 348 (explaining that the EAJA is unique among “prevailing party” fee-
shifting statutes because it requires that the prevailing party must have “incurred” the 
fees). 
 172 The EAJA only applies when the United States is the losing party.  28 U.S.C. § 
2412(d) (2006). 
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represents a byproduct of a collision with the Debt Collection Im-
provement Act.
173
 
As noted in Part II.B, the Supreme Court cases on this question 
avoid the issue of the payable party.  Most of those precedents involve 
a conflict between the client and the attorney rather than a conflict 
between the client with his attorney against the adverse party.
174
  As a 
result, they are so easily distinguishable from the current situation 
that they provide little help.  Although the Supreme Court has gen-
erally referred to the client as the recipient of the fees and has some-
times explicitly designated the “plaintiff” or the “claimant” as the fee 
target, the Court only did so as dicta and never in an instance when it 
was central to the determination of who should be the recipient of 
fees when both the client and his counsel want them paid directly to 
counsel.
175
  These dicta provide guidance on how the Court has 
viewed the term in the past but not in a way that significantly aids in 
solving the payable-party issue in this situation. 
With the law as it stands today, the majority of courts addressing 
this question―including the Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, 
Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits ―have put forth the best read-
ing of the statute.  The plain meaning of the term “prevailing party” 
suggests that the EAJA directs payment to the actual client seeking re-
lief in the case.  Further, if not for the Debt Collection Improvement 
Act, payments directly to clients would fulfill the goals of the EAJA 
just as effectively as would payments to counsel.  Supreme Court in-
terpretations of the term “prevailing party,” while not definitive, all 
lend themselves more appropriately to an approach that would pay 
the party rather than his counsel. 
B. Why the EAJA’s Policies Should Prevail 
Under current law, unassigned fees paid pursuant to the EAJA 
should be properly payable to the client and not his attorney.
176
  Nev-
 
 173 Stephens ex rel. R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 140 (4th Cir. 2009) (“We also note 
that Stephens’s real problem lies with the Debt Collection Improvement Act, not the 
EAJA.  Prior to the implementation of that statute, our answer to the question posed 
in this case would have had no real practical impact.”). 
 174 See, e.g., Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 84–85 (1990) (involving a dispute be-
tween client and his former counsel over payment of § 1988 fees in light of a contin-
gency arrangement); Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 722–23 (1986) (involving a ques-
tion of whether a client can waive § 1988 attorney’s fees as part of a settlement 
agreement). 
 175 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 176 See supra Part IV.A. 
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ertheless, the goals of the EAJA are inescapably thwarted when attor-
ney’s fees are automatically offset against preexisting government 
debts.  The policy goals of the EAJA and the Debt Collection Im-
provement Act inevitably clash; one statute is a government revenue 
raiser while the other encourages lawsuits against the government.
177
  
When comparing these two policies, however, the goals of the EAJA 
are far more important for society.  As the House Conference Report 
on the EAJA said, 
[T]he government with its greater resources and expertise can in 
effect coerce compliance with its position. . . . 
 . . . [The EAJA] rests on the premise that a party who chooses to 
litigate an issue against the government is not only representing 
his or her own vested interest but is also refining and formulating 
public policy.
178
 
Fees under the EAJA are available for prevailing parties in vir-
tually any civil case against the federal government.
179
  These include 
not only the aforementioned Social Security disability appeals but al-
so numerous other actions, including erroneous forfeitures, stays of 
deportation orders, and appeals of some veterans’ disability bene-
fits.
180
  In passing the EAJA, Congress intended to make the courts 
widely available to aggrieved parties and to ease the process of pur-
 
 177 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 11 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 
4990.  The Debt Collection Improvement Act contains scant legislative history, but its 
goals are transparent.  See 31 U.S.C. § 3716 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 104-537 (1996) 
(Conf. Rep.); Paras N. Shah, Comment, Lockhart v. United States: Decapitating the 
New Deal & Ignoring the Plain Language of the Social Security and Debt Collection Improve-
ment Acts, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 455, 460–63 (2006) (explaining the history and opera-
tion of the Debt Collection Act as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement 
Act). 
 178 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 10 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 
4988. 
 179 See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1), (b) (2006) (stating that EAJA fees and costs are 
available “to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United 
States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his or her official 
capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action”) (emphasis added). 
 180 The examples of cases allowing for recovery of fees pursuant to EAJA are too 
extensive to list exhaustively.  See, e.g., Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 405 
(2004) (successful appeal of denial of veteran’s disability benefits); Carbonell v. INS, 
429 F.3d 894, 895–97 (9th Cir. 2005) (successful appeal of a deportation order); 
United States v. 2659 Roundhill Drive, 283 F.3d 1146, 1148–49 (9th Cir. 2002) (suc-
cessful appeal of government property forfeiture); Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Bush, 
159 F. Supp. 2d 707, 709 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001) (successful suit enjoining the Secre-
tary of Commerce to inform the President of  “reason to believe” that Italy was en-
gaging in illegal driftnet fishing); see also Sisk, supra note 17, at 230 (“In sum, the 
EAJA encompasses nearly every claim or case that is civil, rather than criminal, in na-
ture.”). 
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suing judicial remedies.
181
  The benefits of encouraging people to 
bring forth these types of cases far outweigh the benefits of the rela-
tively meager revenue-raising accomplishments of offsetting win-
nings. 
Nevertheless, compelling as these policy incentives might be, 
they cannot overcome the barriers to direct attorney payment in the 
absence of an assignment, most notably the operative statutory lan-
guage.  When Congress drafted the EAJA, it left open the possibility 
of the government offsetting plaintiffs’ fees in “prevailing party” ac-
tions.  The Debt Collection Improvement Act sets forth certain ex-
ceptions to administrative offsets.  The exceptions are narrow but 
create the inescapable conclusion that Congress made a decision to 
exempt certain government payments without including fee-shifting 
statutes among those exemptions.
182
  Congress may simply have failed 
to investigate the issue adequately before passing the legislation.  Af-
ter all, awards of past-due Social Security benefits are partially ex-
empt, including attorney’s fees awarded from those benefits.183  It is 
therefore peculiar that Congress would choose to partially exempt 
from offsets attorney’s fee payments for Social Security claimants pur-
suant to one statute but permit offsets under another similar statute.  
But the distinction is not necessarily arbitrary; the exempted fees are 
removed directly from the prevailing party’s awarded benefits while 
the offset-eligible fees are extra governmental payments to a person 
who is already indebted to the government.  Therefore, the effect of 
not offsetting EAJA fees would be for the government to pay the pre-
vailing party’s private debts before collecting on the party’s govern-
ment debts. 
 
 181 The only apparent restriction on the scope of the EAJA is that the action must 
be “civil.”  Therefore, acquitted defendants in criminal cases and successful appel-
lants of criminal convictions are not eligible for fees under the EAJA.  Further, some 
circuits have held that an application for a writ of habeas corpus is not a “civil action” 
in the way that the EAJA intends.  O’Brien v. Moore, 395 F.3d 499, 501 (4th Cir. 
2005) (“Because the EAJA does not expressly authorize an award of attorneys fees to 
a prevailing party in a habeas corpus proceeding and because the term ‘civil action’ does 
not unambiguously encompass habeas actions, we conclude that the EAJA does not 
contain the unequivocal expression of congressional intent necessary to amount to a 
waiver of sovereign immunity . . . .”). 
 182 See 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(e)(2) (2008) (listing exemptions from administrative off-
sets). 
 183 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(C) (2006). 
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C. The Limited Availability of a Judicial Remedy 
In an ordinary situation, the plain language of the statute will di-
rect to the client payment that will then be eligible for offsets.  More 
recently, however, courts have shown an increased willingness to 
permit payments directly to the attorney when the client signs an as-
signment of fees to counsel, even in circuits with a default rule for 
payment to the client.
184
  In the Eleventh Circuit in particular, district 
courts have directed the fees to the attorney but only when the client 
has presented an assignment.
185
  There is no clear reason why this 
practice has become widespread in the Eleventh Circuit but not else-
where.  Courts favoring this approach cite to Reeves v. Astrue,
186
 which 
directed payment to the client, and distinguish it because it did not 
involve an assignment.
187
  Courts in other circuits are less accommo-
dating to this compromise.
188
  No appellate court has yet addressed 
this practice, but it seems to be a reasonable position that is faithful 
to the EAJA’s underlying policies and adheres to its literal statutory 
language. 
Under this Eleventh Circuit practice, the client’s assignment 
serves as his affirmative representation that courts should direct the 
 
 184 See Spradlin v. Astrue, 626 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (recogniz-
ing the “common practice of other courts in” the Middle District of Florida of per-
mitting an assignment to allow direct payment to attorney); Kersey v. Astrue, No. 
2:08cv00045, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43355, at *13 (W.D. Va. May 21, 2009) (permit-
ting assignment to prevail over default rule of payment to client); Coffman v. Astrue, 
No. 8:07-CV-1416-T-TGW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101299, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 
2008) (Commissioner of Social Security declines to oppose an award directly to 
counsel when client signs an assignment); Nayab v. Astrue, No. 07cv0733 JM(WMc), 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86927, at *18–19 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2008) (same); Flentroy-
Tennant v. Astrue, No. 3:07-cv-101-J-TEM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49304, at *5–6 
(M.D. Fla. June 26, 2008) (permitting an assignment to the attorney as a means to 
avoid debt offsets).   
 185 See, e.g., McCullough v. Astrue, 565 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1332 (M.D. Fla. 2008); cf. 
Hynes v. Astrue, No. 3:07cv245/LAC/EMT, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107064, at *4–5 
n.2 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2008) (recognizing this approach as a common practice). 
 186 526 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 187 E.g., Thompson v. Astrue, No. 3:08-cv-355-J-MCR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7198, 
at *5–6 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2009). 
 188 See, e.g., Rosenstiel v. Astrue, No. 2:08-231-DCR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87005, 
at *6 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2009) (providing that assignment to attorney does not over-
come EAJA requirement of payment to client); Greer v. Astrue, No. CIV-08-284-D, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46406, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2009) (same); Patton v. As-
true, No. CIV-07-329-SPS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6951, at *4 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 29, 
2009) (stating that fees go to client even when attorney has a lien on EAJA awards). 
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attorney’s fees to the attorney.189  Because such an assignment is al-
ready necessary for the direct payment of fees through the portion of 
the client’s past-due benefits pursuant to § 406, it seems reasonable 
to adopt the same straightforward practice to direct payment of EAJA 
fees, even though it is not yet entirely clear whether such an assign-
ment will always serve the purpose of avoiding offsets.
190
  In some 
ways, this option is superior to the rule allowing for automatic and 
default attorney payment, as it ensures the client a more informed 
and flexible role in determining the destination of the fees.  Al-
though the result will likely be the same, as most clients would prob-
ably assign the fees to counsel,
191
 this process has the benefit of being 
consistent with both the language and the goals of the EAJA.  In the 
future, more attorneys should present this argument,
192
 and more 
courts in other circuits should consider it as an option. 
D. The Broader Need for Corrective Legislation 
Judicial recognition of assignments is entirely workable, but only 
a relatively small number of courts practice it.  As a result, Congress 
should act to guarantee the effectuation of the EAJA’s goals.  On 
March 26, 2009, Representative Peter DeFazio, an Oregon Democrat 
 
 189 See Dotson v. Astrue, No. 08-0095-CG-M, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6254, at *1–2 
n.1 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 8, 2009) (denying direct payment to attorney because “there is no 
supporting documentation, such as a signed fee agreement or an assignment of the 
fee, attached”). 
 190 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SSA PUB. NO. 05-10001, REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS FOR 
DIRECT PAYMENTS TO REPRESENTATIVES 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10001.pdf.  Whether the assignment will prevent offsets 
may still be an open question, and it appears that at this time, the offsets still occur 
even when an assignment is present.  3 NAT’L ORG. OF SOC. SEC. CLAIMANTS’ 
REPRESENTATIVES, SOCIAL SECURITY PRACTICE GUIDE § 27.03[10] (2009) (“[I]f the 
plaintiff has an unpaid federal debt, . . . the amount of the EAJA fee may be reduced 
by this debt amount, even if the check is made payable to the attorney.”); see also Wol-
ler v. Astrue, No. 08-60733-CIV-COHN, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2684, at *2 (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 14, 2009) (declining to decide whether an assignment, which allowed for direct 
payment to attorney, could prevent offsets from ensuing because “the issue [was] not 
ripe in the specific context of this award”). 
 191 Contra Viega v. Astrue, No. 8:07-CV-1001-T-EAJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3494, at 
*3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2009) (claimant requests that she, and not her attorney, be the 
direct recipient of fees). 
 192 This argument is likely to receive more attention in the future because the Na-
tional Organization of Social Security Claimants’ Representatives now recommends 
that all attorneys representing clients potentially subject to offsets obtain assignments 
of fees.  Press Release, Nat’l Org. of Soc. Sec. Claimants’ Representatives, Supreme 
Court to Determine EAJA Payee (Oct. 5, 2009) (on file with author). 
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known for taking some “idiosyncratic views,”193 introduced legislation 
to address the current issue.
194
  Representative DeFazio’s legislation 
would address the issue only with regard to the EAJA as it applies to 
Social Security claimants by adding a new section to the EAJA that 
would specify payment to the attorney directly and also exempt Social 
Security payments from Debt Collection Improvement Act offsets.
195
 
The enactment of Representative DeFazio’s proposal would be a 
good starting point and would address most of the current problems 
because the overwhelming majority of these disputes arise through 
cases involving Social Security disability appeals.  But his legislation 
fails to address the full scope of the problem because in different sit-
uations it can be either too broad or too narrow. 
The proposal is too broad because it rewrites part of the EAJA to 
direct attorney’s fee payments directly to attorneys.  This new scheme 
ensures that the attorney would receive all fees owed to her, but di-
recting fees exclusively to the attorney with no client rights could 
pose a significant problem when the client and the attorney disagree 
on the desired outcome, such as in Evans v. Jeff D.196  Changing the ac-
tual language of the fee-shifting statute would be the ideal solution 
when the Social Security claimant and his attorney agree that the at-
torney should be the recipient, but it would open the door to other 
problems when client and counsel disagree and could have the effect 
of undermining a client’s autonomy. 
Representative DeFazio’s solution is too narrow because it affects 
only EAJA payments pursuant to Social Security cases.  Therefore, the 
same problem could arise in other non-Social Security cases under 
the EAJA or in cases involving non-EAJA fee-shifting statutes.
197
  The 
portion of the proposed legislation that would prevent Debt Collec-
tion Improvement Act offsets of EAJA payments arising from Social 
Security claims, if expanded to encompass all “prevailing party” fee-
shifting statutes, would be an ideal solution to the problem.  Under 
the current law, certain government payments are not subject to debt 
offsets, but these payments are narrow and do not include attorney’s 
 
 193 MICHAEL BARONE & RICHARD E. COHEN, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
2008, at 1368 (2008). 
 194 H.R. 1735, 111th Cong. (2009).  He previously introduced the same legislation 
in the 110th Congress (2007–2008), but it never received a committee hearing or any 
action.  H.R. 5833, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 195 H.R. 1735.  
 196 475 U.S. 717 (1986). 
 197 See infra Part IV.E. 
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fees.
198
  Congress could easily expand this list to include payments re-
sulting from awards of attorney’s fees under the EAJA and other fed-
eral laws.  This solution would not curtail the continued use of the 
client as a middleman between the court and the attorney on fee 
payments, but it would help limit the risk of unintended conse-
quences of changing the EAJA language itself.  Any statutory remedy 
should therefore only aim at stopping the offsets. 
The goal of ensuring that attorneys are paid in full is an impor-
tant one, especially with regard to the types of cases that draw EAJA 
fees.  EAJA fees are capped at the fairly modest amount of $125 per 
hour (with cost of living adjustments available) and contain net-worth 
caps for prevailing parties.
199
  With these types of restrictions, EAJA 
fees become disproportionately important in practice areas involving 
impoverished clients.
200
  If the administration of justice regardless of 
client income is accepted as a societal goal, then it is important to 
promote every possible incentive for attorneys to enter these fields.  
The low price tag on EAJA fees is problematic enough; the threat of 
government offsets only further deters attorneys from pursuing these 
practice areas. 
E. The Potential Application of “Prevailing Party” Language Beyond 
the EAJA 
As important as EAJA fees may be, they are far from the most 
important potential application of the “prevailing party” language.  
The dispute over the fee recipient has so far only directly arisen in 
the context of EAJA suits, but the language is ubiquitous in federal 
fee-shifting statutes.
201
  Thus, courts could apply their EAJA interpre-
tation to similar “prevailing party” language in other statutes.  This 
possibility is far from merely speculative.  Courts have used interpre-
tations of civil-rights statutes with “prevailing party” fee-shifting lan-
guage as the basis for decisions on EAJA payments,
202
 and they may 
 
 198 The current exceptions to debt offsets are Black Lung Part C benefit payments, 
payments under tariff laws, some Veterans Affairs payments exempted from offset by 
statute, payments under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, federal-loan 
payments other than travel advances, and any payment where offset is prohibited by 
statute or by order of the Treasury Secretary.  31 C.F.R. § 285.5(e)(2) (2008). 
 199 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), (2)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 200 See supra note 180. 
 201 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 202 See, e.g., Ratliff v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 800, 802 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. 
Ct. 48 (2009).   
FISCHETTI (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/2010  4:59 PM 
2010] COMMENT 759 
 
just as readily use interpretations of the same language from EAJA 
cases to apply to civil rights cases. 
As a result, these EAJA rulings could have far-reaching conse-
quences, potentially affecting civil-rights, environmental, consumer-
protection, employment, and government-transparency laws that are 
central to our values as a society.  If this occurs, just as the current 
EAJA laws serve to dissuade attorneys from accepting cases on behalf 
of Social Security disability claimants, attorneys may be persuaded to 
veer away from other public interest cases.
203
  The government could 
have made this argument when these statutes first took effect, but it 
has never done so.  But the same can be said for the first twenty-five 
years of the EAJA, when relatively few cases involved the issue of the 
appropriately payable party.
204
  Despite the government’s longstand-
ing assent to attorney’s fees going directly to the attorney in other 
types of cases, it is far from settled practice; a shift could occur as ra-
pidly as did the shift in EAJA treatment.
205
  In the past, prevailing par-
 
 203 The fee offsets will only apply when the case is against the federal government.  
In most civil-rights cases, all parties will be private persons, private firms, or state or 
municipal governments.  As a result, unlike the EAJA, these statutes provide for fee-
shifting when both the plaintiff and defendant are private parties.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988(b) (2006); id. § 2000A-3(b).  Fee offsets will not ensue unless the federal gov-
ernment is the losing party.  This severely limits the number of cases where offsets 
will become an issue, but when the government itself is liable for a civil-rights viola-
tion or another activity subject to a fee-shifting statute, the suit is perhaps more im-
portant than when a private party is engaged in ordinary discrimination.  See, e.g., 
Akhil Reed Amar, Using State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional Rights: Some Questions 
and Answers About Converse-1983, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159, 176 (1993) (“States should 
enact converse-1983 laws because doing so is in the highest tradition of supporting 
the federal Constitution and vindicating its implicit remedial scheme, which so heavi-
ly depends on each government policing the other to vindicate citizen rights.”); Mat-
thew J. Perry, Justice Murphy and the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Doctrine: A Contri-
bution Unrecognized, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 247–58 (2000) (describing the 
background of the Equal Protection Clause’s application against the federal govern-
ment and its significance); see also MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION: 
THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945–1990, at 40–45, 119–32 
(1991).  
 204 See Vargas v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 07-3586, 2008 WL 699581, at *8 n.4 
(D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2008) (pointing out that even though some precedent existed for 
the payment of clients directly, the government has only recently sought to actually 
enforce it). 
 205 In many of the cases regarding the proper payable party under EAJA, courts 
have acknowledged that the longstanding traditional practice was to direct funds 
straight to the attorney.  See Quade v. Barnhart, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172–73 (D. 
Ariz. 2008); Meyler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 04-4669, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
51684, at *11–12 (D.N.J. July 7, 2008); see also Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246, 1255 
(10th Cir. 2007) (pointing out that the government changed its position on the ap-
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ties have occasionally entered into disputes with their adversaries over 
whether the client or counsel should receive payment, but these cases 
rarely addressed the question directly and never involved instances 
where both the client and counsel wanted payment directed to coun-
sel.
206
  The government took a significant leap in the EAJA cases by 
pursuing litigation for no apparent purpose other than to offset the 
fees of prevailing parties.
207
 
In suits against the government under non-EAJA “prevailing par-
ty” fee-shifting statutes, the government still retains a financial incen-
tive to seek offsets.  Unless the government decides to exercise a 
greater degree of self-restraint, perhaps for fear that the same 
changes in the context of civil rights or government transparency 
could garner greater attention or outrage than Social Security disabil-
ity appeals, the government will likely pursue debt offsets against civil-
rights recoveries in the same way that it has under the EAJA.
208
  In 
fact, such an outcome is more probable now than it would have been 
if these arguments first appeared in civil-rights cases.  Because of this 
EAJA issue, five circuits now have controlling precedent to the effect 
 
propriate payable party during the course of litigation), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 486 
(2008). 
 206 See, e.g., Collins v. Romer, 962 F.2d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
fees are payable to plaintiff, not his attorney directly, even though plaintiff was 
dropped from some counts in multiparty suit); Willard v. City of Los Angeles, 803 
F.2d 526, 527 (9th Cir. 1986) (providing that when plaintiff agreed to waive attor-
ney’s fees as part of a settlement, his attorney had no standing to seek fees on his 
own) (citing Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986)); Jonas v. Stack, 758 F.2d 567, 568 
(11th Cir. 1985) (determining that attorney who prosecuted fee litigation for attor-
ney of prevailing party lacked standing because he did not personally represent the 
prevailing party); Brown v. Gen. Motors Corp., Chevrolet Div., 722 F.2d 1009, 1011 
(2d Cir. 1983) (asserting that after client discharged his attorney, attorney lacked 
standing to apply for own fees); Miller v. Amusement Enters., Inc., 426 F.2d 534, 539 
(5th Cir. 1970) (stating that the court is responsible for ensuring “that the fees al-
lowed are to reimburse and compensate for legal services rendered” and holding 
that the Court will consequently not pay “to the litigants”). 
 207 The government has admitted that its new policy of insisting on payment only 
to the client is a result of improved technology that makes it easier to track who has 
debts that are subject to offset.  Stephens v. Astrue, 539 F. Supp. 2d 802, 809–10 (D. 
Md. 2008), rev’d, 565 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2009); Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 4.  The change in methodology is so 
recent that the Social Security Administration’s own handbook still indicates that 
when a federal court rules in favor of a plaintiff in a Social Security case, his “attorney 
may request reimbursement of the expenses he or she incurred in representing” the 
plaintiff.  SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK § 2019.7 (2009), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.20/handbook-2019.html. 
 208 The Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to exempt certain types of 
payments from offsets under certain circumstances.  31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(B) 
(2006); 31 C.F.R. § 285.5(e)(2)(vi) (2008). 
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that attorney’s fees can be offset under the Debt Collection Im-
provement Act.  The Supreme Court will soon hear and decide Astrue 
v. Ratliff and potentially set down a national standard on how to in-
terpret this portion of the EAJA.  Although the Court will resolve the 
circuit split on this specific question, Congress should still consider 
additional amendments to clarify the EAJA on these important issues. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the first two decades of the EAJA, only occasional disputes 
arose over the proper payable party.  Only the Federal Circuit and a 
smattering of district courts addressed the issue, and it often arose as 
a result of disputes between an attorney and her client.  That 
changed when the Social Security Administration altered its 
longstanding practice and began requesting fee payment exclusively 
to the client.  As a result of that change, the issue now arises frequent-
ly in the context of common appeals from administrative decisions to 
deny Social Security disability benefits.  While the payments previous-
ly went  to the attorneys directly, essentially by consent as a result of a 
prevailing party’s uncontested request, courts have now been forced 
to take a position on the question of the proper recipient. 
Under the current law, the plain language of the statute unam-
biguously directs the funds to the client rather than his counsel.  Ad-
ditionally, the broader construction of the statute and the legislative 
history, once divorced from the intent and history of the Debt Collec-
tion Improvement Act, at least partially support direct payment to the 
client.  Although the attorney has a contractual right to the funds, the 
client incurs the cost of the fees and is entitled to be the immediate 
beneficiary of the fee payments.  Courts have some flexibility to im-
plement their own solutions to the problem when the client assigns 
his fee rights to counsel, but otherwise the language is fairly tight and 
inescapable.  The law on this matter is, however, palpably flawed from 
a policy standpoint.  It fulfills the Debt Collection Improvement Act’s 
goals of supporting alternate collection techniques for the prevailing 
party’s debts, but the practice of paying fees to the client rather than 
the attorney does not serve the best interests of the client, the attor-
ney, or society over the long term.  Making it more difficult for an at-
torney to collect her fees in full discourages attorneys from entering 
fields heavily reliant on government-paid attorney’s fees and thus de-
feats the very purpose of the EAJA.  Furthermore, the current law 
overcomes the congressional goal of allowing each person whom the 
government wronged to help with “refining and formulating public 
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policy” through the courts.209  For whatever reason, Congress’s broad-
er scheme regards the revenue-raiser actions as more important than 
the goals of the EAJA.  Although courts may be tempted to remedy 
this inexplicable misplacement of priorities, the statutory language is 
sufficiently clear that courts ought not unnecessarily venture to fix 
the problem in the absence of a fee assignment.
210
 
Although assignments enable courts to provide direct payment 
to attorneys to mitigate this risk, courts will not accept this approach 
universally.  For that reason, the best solution is for Congress to re-
medy this flawed statutory arrangement.  This can be accomplished 
through the simple addition of attorney’s fees to the list of exemp-
tions from offsets in the Debt Collection Improvement Act.  A com-
plete overhaul of all “prevailing party” fee-shifting statutes, with a 
goal of clarifying the intent to pay attorneys directly, would solve the 
immediate problem but would pose a risk of unintended conse-
quences in the event of a conflict between a client and his attorney.  
The current practice of paying EAJA fees to clients has the potential 
to create an enormous disincentive for attorneys to enter fields of law 
that rely on EAJA fees or to take cases involving clients indebted to 
the government.  The current practice also presents significant risk 
that the common statutory language could create a spillover effect 
that will adversely affect the attorneys of other non-EAJA plaintiffs 
suing the federal government.  Just as the government suddenly 
changed its approach to EAJA fees, nothing prevents it from doing 
the same with other fee-shifting statutes.  The scope and implications 
of the change in practice under the EAJA are relatively narrow, but 
the flaw in the current drafting could reverberate to cause a chilling 
effect on a much broader array of important lawsuits.  Without adop-
tion of the assignment alternative or congressional action, the EAJA 
might effectively become a self-defeating statute that, in many cases, 
fails to accomplish its centerpiece goal of permitting individuals to 
pursue cases against the government. 
 
 
 209 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 10 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 
4988. 
 210 See Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 738 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that even if the 
EAJA language on attorney’s fees represents “bad public policy,” decisions on policy 
“are properly left to Congress, not the courts”). 
